Louisville Law Examiner Serving the University of Louisville School of Law Community
Volume 9, Number 5 Louisville, Kentucky, March, 1984
Jailhouse Reality Follows
Drunk Driving Arrest
By Tim Cocanougher
Joe Bar head saunters to his car. A
night of drinking and partying has put
Joe in a wonderful mood. Undaunted by
an obvious impairment of driving skills
(it took him five minutes to remember
how to turn the lights on), Joe finally
gets his car started and heads for home.
However, Joe's happy mood will be
short-lived. A policeman notices Joe's
erratic driving and after confirming his
suspicions, detours Joe to the county jail
where drunk drivers are slapped with the
reality that they have broken the law.
to refuse. However, he is also informed
that if he refuses, the state will
automatically pull his driver's license.
Joe will then be placed in a holdover
area until his paperwork is completed,
which usually takes two or three hours.
After this is completed and a judge is
contacted, Joe may be released on his
own recognizance or on bond. If the
paperwork is completed before 5:30
a.m., Joe will be arraigned that morn­ing,
if not, his arraignment will be the
following day.
Circulation 5400
Officer Gary Gallenstein, a seven-year
veteran with the Jefferson County
Department of Corrections, outlined the
basic procedure Joe would encounter
when brought to jail.
Once inside the jail, Joe would be
strip-searched to ensure he was not car­rying
weapons or drugs. His personal
belongings would be taken and he would
then fill out a medical history question­naire.
After obtaining a release from jail,
Joe's ordeal is only half over. He still
must face prosecution which is usually
financially painful. County prosecutor
Richard Schulton explained the method
employed by his office in dealing with
drunk drivers.
Schulton first noted that DWI cases
are unlike any other criminal cases
because the major piece of evidence (the
breathalyzer test) is administered after
the arrest. This is frequently a problem
area because the policeman makes the
arrest based on observation of the
suspect. If the breathalyzer results do
not confirm the policeman's suspicion,
the suspect cannot be "unarrested."
When this occurs, the prosecutor may
seek a lower charge, such as reckless
driving, but in no circumstances will the
county attorney agree to drop the
charges completely.
Photo by Crystal Collins
A drunk driving suspect tries to touch his nose in one of several tests to
determine coordination and impaired driving ability.
His next stop is the slap-print table
where he is finger-printed and given an
armband and an ID number. He is then
taken to the property room and watches
his property being itemized to verify its
amount and existence. He is also
photographed and this information is
placed in the files of various law en­forcement
agencies, including the FBI.
This procedure takes approximately
20 minutes. Within an hour after
custody, the breathalyzer test is ad­ministered.
Before taking the test, Joe is
read his rights and is told he has the right
Now, back to Joe where the arraign­ment
stage awaits. Here, Joe will make
his plea. If he pleads guily (600Jo-700Jo
plead guilty) and it is his first offense,
the fine will probably be $200. If Joe has
FRCP Rule 11 Amended
other drunk driving charges, his fine will
be higher (up to $500) and he is likely to
spend up to 15 days in jail as well. If the
General Assembly comes up with a final
version of a new drunk driving statute,
these penalties are likely to be stiffer.
See Related Story and Photos
on page 7
If Joe pleads not guilty, he is entitled
to a jury trial. However, a strong public
disgust with drunk driving has changed
the trend in jury convictions. A few
years ago, juries very seldom convicted,
but today most jury verdicts end in con­viction.
To keep the story short, Joe was a
first-time offender and given a $200.00
fine with a warning that subsequent of­fenses
would incur a harsher penalty.
Joe's introduction to this system is not
intended to convert him into a Southern
Baptist who abstains from drinking li­quor,
demonstrates for the return of
prohibition and hangs Jerry Falwell's
picture on his wall.
However, it should make him aware
that drunk driving is no longer a minor
offense. Stronger penalties and a grow­ing
public awareness of the dangers of
drinking and driving suggest that when
one has had "one too many" the in­telligent
decision is to find an alternative
route home before getting behind the
wheel.
Changes Mean More Responsibility on Lawyers
Photo by Judy Hoge
By Marlin M. Volz
Professor of Law, University of
Louisville
Effective August I, I983, major
changes were made in Rules II, I6 and
26 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, greatly enlarging the role of
the judge in the control and
management of litigation and increasing
the personal responsibility of lawyers
who sign pleadings, motions and other
papers. Of the three major changes,
Kentucky has adopted only one. On
January I, I984, the Supreme Court of
Kentucky amended Rule II so that it
reads identically to revised Federal Rule
II. However, in doing so, it did not
include the language which the
amendments to the Federal Rules added
to Rule 7(c) directing that "All motions
shall be signed in accordance with Rule
II." The intent of that addition was to
make explicit the applicability to
motions of the standards activated by
signing which amended Rule 11 imposes.
However, it appears that the addition of
such language is unnecessary to the
achievement of the intended result since
the same result is obtained by present
Kentucky Rule 7 .02(2) when construed
together with amended Rule II. It is my
opinion that the signing requirements
and sanctions of Rule 11, as amended,
apply in Kentucky to motions and other
papers as well as to pleadings,
Applicability of Rule 11 to
Motions and Other Papers
Certainly as to the form of signing,
i.e. "by at least one attorney of record in
his individual name, whose address shall
be stated'', Rule 7 .02(2) by the
continued use of the word "signing",
which was eliminated from Rule 7(b) by
the Federal amendments, plainly
borrows from Rule 11 such requirement
and applies it to motions and other
papers. Rule 7.02(2) provides:
The Rules applicable to captions,
signing, and other matters of form of
pleadings apply to all motions and
other papers provided for by these
Rules. (Emphasis supplied).
It is to be noted that the only Rule
pertaining to signing identified as such is
Rule II.'
Furthermore, the amended language
of Rule II makes clear that its
substantive provisions apply to motions
and other papers as well as to pleadings.
The new wording of the title of the Rule
indicates as much. It had read, "Signing
of Pleadings"; it now reads, "Signing of
(Continued on Page 6)
l Louisville Law Examiner, March, 1984
Louisville Law Examiner
EDITORIAL BOARD
Judy Hoge
Editor-in-Chief
Neil Ward
Associate Editor
Crystal Collins
Associate Editor
Photography Editor
Tim Cocanougher
Yolanda French
. .
John Schaaf
Managing Editor
Jon Hardy
Brandeis Brief Editor
Winnie McConnell
Night Associate Editor
STAFF
Todd Hollenbach
Mike Schafer
David Taylor
Joel D. Zakem
ProfeiiOI' LAURENCE W. KNOWLES, Consultant
Tbe Lontsvllle Law Eumhler is published six times during the academic .
year in the interest of the University of Louisville School of Law community.
ArticJes are invited from faculty members, students, and members of the bar
who wislt to do freelance work. Any proposed article should be cleared with
the Editor as to topic and length.
Address all communications to Tbe Louisville Law Examiner, School of
Law, University of Louisville, LoUisville, Kentucky 40292.
Phone: 502-588-6398. ·
Fi/g Photo
Dedication of New Wing.
Will Include Symposiu01
By Judy Hoge
Kentucky Supreme Court Justice
. Charles Leibson will speak at the official
dedication of the new wing of the Law
School on Friday, April 13. University
of Louisville President Dr. Donald C.
Swain will also be present at the
ceremony. A champagne reception in
the Administration Building will follow.
In honor of the occasion, the Law
School will present a Dedication
Symposium on Friday, April 13 and
Saturday, April 14, entitled "Privacy
and the Family in M-edical Decisions."
According to Seminar Chairman Albert
T. Quick, the topic stemmed from the
school's desire to integrate two areas of
special interest to the sch6ol: privacy,
the cause espoused by Justice Brandeis;
and family law, the subject of the
Journal of Family Law published by the
school.
The symposium will focus on the right
to privacy in the · area of medical
treatment, and will deal specifically with
refusal of life saving and non-life saving
treatment by adults and minors. Formal
presentations by well-known educators
and practitioners will be followed by
commentary from panelists, who will
include Professors Steven R. Smith,
Ralph Petrilli, and Robert L. Stenger.
Audience interaction will be
encouraged.
Speakers at the Symposium will
include Morris Abram, a New York
attorney and past President of Brandeis
University, who was Chairman of the
first Presidential Commission for the
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine.
The Commission dealt with principles of
morality in shaping the development and
application of medical technology .
Presentations will also be made by
George J. Annas, the Utley Professor of
Health Law at Boston University
Schools of Medicine and Public Health;
James Childress, Professor of Medical
Education at the University of Virginia;
and Patricia A. King, Professor of Law
at Georgetown University. Ms. King is
also Senior Research Scholar at the
Kennedy Institute of Ethics.
The fee for .the symposium is $10.
Twelve hours of CLE credit, and ten
hours of CME (Category I AMA) credit
will be given. For further information,
call Susan Bourne at 588-7806.
Photo by Crystal Collins
East Wing of Law School: Then and Now
Few of us remember when it wasn't
here, and most of us can't imagine life
without it.
The move into the new East wing of
the law school in January, 1982,
culminated years of planning and
construction, instigated by a report from
the ABA accreditation committee which
followed a visit to the school by an
inspection team in 1976. As the existing
structure was designed to accommodate
80 to 90 students, and enrollment was
510, a new structure for classrooms was·
clearly necessary for compliance with
minimum ABA space requirements.
When Dean Harold Wren took office
in 1976, he told the ABA that the new
wing would be a top priority item, and
predicted its completion during the
1980-82 biennium.
In his "State of the Law School"
address in October, 1979, Wren
announced that construction would start
on the six million dollar building project
by Fall of 1980, with completion
expected in roughly 18 months.
The new wing was to be symmetrical
with the Library wing when viewed from
the oval, accessible to the handicapped,
and contain numerous well-lighted
classrooms of various sizes.
The first step was the razing of the old
Law School Annex whose rickety
narrow stairs and cramped archaic
lecture hall were familiar to generations
of students.
There followed a period of major
inconveniences for faculty and students
alike. Bulldozers, jackhammers, cranes
and trucks brought noise, dust, drilling,
vibration and confusion daily. Classes
were shuttled from one location to
another, but the fear that the whole
school or individual classes would have
to move to another building on campus
was never realized.
Despite a seven-week strike which
brought construction to a standstill, the
addition was completed on schedule and
the wing was fully operational in time
for the beginning of the Spring, 1982
semester.
Boasting four large classrooms,
seating from 60 to 140 students, and
several smaller seminar rooms, the new
wing was clean, shiny, and best of all,
quiet. The ,addition also provided office
space for student organizations such as
Moot Court, the Student Bar
Association, the Law Examiner and the
Journal of Family Law, as well as forty
faculty and staff offices, numerous
study rooms and two student lounges,
one with kitchen facilities.
Photo by Crystal Collins
By Winnie McConnell
So you want to improve your grade
point average in law school, and you
need help from competent advisors?
What better clues on excelling in law can
be given than from three University of
Louisville evening law students who are
ranked number one academically in their
respective classes?
The three students, Jim Lesousky,
fourth-year; Lisa Vogt, third-year; and
Kathy Holder, second-year; agree that
"organization" is the key element in
their strategies for studying law.
"Organization of my class notes with
notes I make after reading cases is
critical," said · Lesousky. "I believe the
amount of organization I put forth in
making outlines is an asset to helping me
in grades."
"Good study habits revolve around
organization and how you allocate your
time," said Ms. Vogt. "Self-discipline in
making yourself study at designated
times is also very important."
Organization is also necessary when
taking a final examination, according to
Ms. Holder.
"You have to think about the issues
and organize your thoughts before you
answer questions," said Ms. Holder.
"Being well-prepared to recognize
what's going on in the exam is crucial."
Thorough preparation for law classes
is vital in learning the legal concepts. All
three students suggested that taking
good class notes and briefing cases is
advantageous.
"It takes extra time to brief cases but I
feel I learn more," said Ms. Vogt,
adding that she briefs every case she
reads because she prefers her own
interpretation of the case.
Lesousky also spends much of his
time on weekends taking notes and
briefing material for the following
week's classes. "It takes me between
three and four hours to write notes of
each course's assignment," he said.
On the other hand, Ms. Holder
CLASS ACTION
1977
Darryl W. Durham has been elected
Secretary of the Louisville Bar
Association . He is with the firm of
Barnett & Alagia.
1982
Mark Heal is with the firm of Williams
& Paimore, specializing in worker's
compensation defense for self-insured
employers.
Louisville Law Examiner, March, 1984
NIGHT and DAY
Top Night Students
Share Success Secrets
doesn't brief cases but writes issues and
other reminders of the law inside her
textbook. "No one would ever want to
use my books after I finish with them
because they could never read the
print," she said.
As final examinations approach, the
three students concentrate their efforts
extensively on making outlines.
''Every semester I take off one week
from work before final exams and
literally bury myself in the law library
working on my outlines," said
Lesousky. "Some days I'll work from 12
to 20 hours bringing together issues and
rules."
Ms. Holder reviews her notes and
outlines courses several weeks ahead of
the reading days.
"I am by nature a crammer," she
said. "I take off from work one day per
final and study from 7 a.m. right up to
the hour of the exam. This works for me
because I have a good short-term
memory.''
Commercial outlines, such as
Gilberts, Emmanuel's and the Nutshell
series, are not widely used by anyone. of
the trio. Ms. Vogt, who depends mainly
on her own case briefs and class notes to
make her outlines, said that no one
should primarily rely on the commercial
outlines because they cover only a
narrow perspective of the law.
While the three students exhibit
"personal pride" in being among the
top students in their law classes, they
don't feel any extra pressures to retain
their high academic standing when
preparing for finals.
"Inherent in attending law school is
that extra tension," said Ms. Vogt. "But
I don't feel any more burdened than if I ·
was ranked fifth."
"If you do well you want to continue
to do well no matter what your academic
ranking is," said Ms. Holder. "Law
school is like a basketball tournament. It
comes down to how hard you work, how
motivated you are and a heck of a lot of
luck!"
Photo by Judy Hoge
Night students Lisa Vogt, Kathy Holder (standing), and Jim Lesousky are
ranked number one in their respective classes.
1983
J. Keith Cartwright is working for a
Madisonville firm, Moore, Morrow &
Frymire.
Terry D. Edwards is a Captain in the
U.S. Air Force, stationed in Vandenberg
Air Force Base in California.
Michael W. Milby is Personnel
Assistant with American Greetings,
Corbin, Ky.
Dennis Lyndell Pickett is with Stites &
Harbison in their Lexington office.
Hank Robinson is working for the
CPA firm of Coopers & Lybrand in
Louisville.
Robert E. Thieman is with the
Louisville firm of Ogden, Robertson &
Marshall .
Paul B. Whitty is working for Wyatt,
Tarrant & Combs.
Prof Accepts
Provost Post
3
Professor Leslie W. Abramson is
currently dividing his time between his
teaching duties and his new job as
Acting Assistant Provost to the recently­created
Office of the University Provost.
The Administration combined the duties
of Vice-President for Academic Affairs
and the Executive Vice-President to
form the new office in July, 1983.
Abramson said he will concentrate on
tnree areas while at the Provost's Office:
reviewing the by-laws of each unit of the
University; representing his office on the
Arts and Sciences' Dean review
committee; and representing the
Provost's Office on space and
renovation matters.
A search committee for a permanent
Provost, co-chaired by Professor of Law
Robert L. Stenger, plans to fill the
position by July 1, 1984. However,
Professor Abramson regards his
position as temporary a,nd expects to
return full-time to teaching in the Spring
semester of 1985, following a sabbatical
leave this fall.
Abramson is currently teaching a
seminar in Civil Procedure. He usually
offers classes in Professional
Responsibility (Ethics), Criminal Law
and Procedure and Antitrust Law.
Briefs
New Library Hours
The library is now open at 8:00 a.m.
on Sundays. It will be open 24 hours a
day from the beginning of reading days
through the exam period.
Anatomy For Lawyers
A seminar on "The Back: Anatomical
& Clinical Correlations," sponsored by
the University of Louisville School of
Law, will be held April 27 in the
Auditorium of the Health Sciences
Center on Belknap Campus. Registra­tion
is $70; 5 Vz hours of CLE credit will
be given.
4 Louisville Law Examiner, March, 1984
BRANDEIS BRIEF: Sex Discri
g
Bonnie M. Brown is a Louisville
attorney concentrating in domestic
relations and health law. She holds an
A.B. degree in Political Science from
Washington Unive1sity where she wrote
her thesis . on "The Women's
Movement." She earned her J.D. in
1978 from the University of Louisville,
where she was President of the Women's
Law Caucus, and a member of the
National Moot .Court Team.
Ms. Brown Is the current President of
River City Business and Professional
Women. In addition, she is involved in
the Women Lawyers Association,
Louisville Rape Relief Center, and the
Coalition Against Spouse Abuse. Ms.
Brown has also lectured and published
primarily in the area of domestic
relations.
There is currently pending before the
United States Supreme Court a suit by
Elizabeth A. Hishon, a former associate
of the King and Spalding law firm,
charging she was denied partner status
because she was not judged by the same
standards as male associates. The
Atlanta firm, containing former United
States Attorney General Griffin Bell as
one of its leading partners, claimed that
lawyers must be free from governmental
pressures in choosing acceptable
partners.
The Law Examiner asked for the
following analysis of the issues
presented by this landmark case.
Maureen Reagan recently observed,
"(T)hey (the "old boys") moved the
wall up three stories. Women can get in
and start moving up, but at some point,
you'll still hit that brick wall." 1
The "brick wall" for women lawyers
appears to be at the partnership level.
Women are entering and graduating
from law schools in record numbers and
apparently are finding few problems
being hired as entry-level associates.
However, women lawyers are not
"making partner" at nearly the rate of
male lawyers. 1
Elizabeth Anderson Hishon has raised
some hard questions in her efforts to
Photo by Judy Hoge
change this situation. Her experiences at
the prestigious Atlanta law firm of King
& Spalding 3 seem to typify those of
many women lawyers in her situation,
making her case all the more important.
She was one of the promising graduates
in Columbia Law School's class of 1972.
That year, she became an associate at
King & Spalding upon the same express
representation made to other promising
law school graduates, namely that she
would be considered for partnership on
a fair, non-discriminatory basis after the
usual five to six year period of
employment as an associate.
However, she alleges that because she
was a woman, King & Spalding treated
her less favorably than male associates.
She was given less responsible work
assignments which tended to involve
smaller matters requiring her to work
alone, without assistance from junior
associates and without the opportunity
to supervise their work. Unlike male
associates who received better, more
responsible work assignments and
associate help, she was not given the
opportunity to demonstrate that she was
"partnership material".
In 1979, she was passed over for
partner. Her employment as an associate
was then terminated under King &
Spalding's "up-or-out policy". She is
currently a partner in the smaller
Atlanta firm of O'Callaghan, Saunders
and Stumm.•
Ms. Hishon has filed suit under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U .S.C. §2000e et.seq., which prohibits
employment discrimination on account
of race, color, national origin, religion,
or sex, by employers with 15 or more
employees. She claims that King &
Spalding engaged in sex discrimination
when they denied her promotion to
partnership. The case is pending in the
United Srates Supreme Court.
Sex Discrimination at
King & Spalding, in the
Legal Profession, and in
Society at large
There is little doubt that, based on her
allegations, Ms. Hishon suffered sex
discrimination at King & Spalding, and
that sex discrimination actually exists in
the legal profession. From Ms. Hishon's
Columbia Law School class, only 3.8
percent (1 of 26) of the women graduates
are partners in prestigious firms
comparable to King & Spalding, while
20 percent of the male graduates are
partners in such firms. Only 11.5 percent
of the women, but 50 percent of the
men, are partners in firms of any sort. 5
A 1982 National Law Journal Survey of
151 of the top 200 law firms showed that
only 3.2 percent (297 out of 9,21 0) of the
partners in those firms were women
while 14 percent of the legal profession
were women.6 The American Bar
Association Journal profile of lawyer
lifestyles revealed that male lawyers
earned more than female lawyers in
every age category. ' An American Bar
Association Journal survey found that
women lawyers work harder and are
paid less than male lawyers. 8
Sex discrimination in the legal
profession operates in much the same
way as it does in society at large. An
understanding of its operation and
effect is essential to any meaningful
discussion of its elimination, a goal in
which Ms. Hishon is joined by many
others.
Sex discrimination is part and parcel
of our entire culture, which has been
described as "patriarchal. " 9 Disparate
treatment of men and women in our
society has been called "sexism." 10
Sexism is not confined to political,
social, or economic institutions. It
invades our attitudes, our language, our
values, and the very way we view life. 11
Analysts of sexism have noted that
"the personal is the. political." 12 This
observation is a way of describing the
all-pervasive nature of sexism in
patriarchal culture. It means, for
example, that the forces that cause a
mother (or father!) to give a chemistry
set only to a son and a doll only to a
daughter are the same forces that
operate twenty years later to cause an
employer to pay the son more than the
daughter for the same work.
Though the forces operating are the
same, the former act is legal, while the
latter act is illegal. This identification of
the personal as political, and the
conceptual blending of the two, is
important to an understanding of sexism
in our society. However, it is disasterous
to the application of legal remedies to
eliminate sex discrimination in a
constitutional democracy with limited
government that respects distinctions
between the public sphere and the
private sphere.
In this simple example, the line is
easily drawn. Government can, and
should, prohibit the latter act of sex
discrimination (unequal pay), but
cannot prohibit the former.
However, the operation of sex
discrimination at King & Spalding is a
telling example of how difficult it can be
to give proper perspective to the
competing interests of eliminating sex
discrimination and preserving civil
liberties (i.e., privacy, freedom of
association). Where is the line drawn?
Which of the following alleged incidents
and/or practices at King & Spalding
should be illegal? 13
• Calling female associates
"sugar" and "honey";
• Kissing female associates on the
cheek;
• Calling several women lawyers
seated together at a firm meeting
"The Kroger Price Patrol," referring
to a T.V. ad campaign aimed at
housewives;
• Refusing to allow a woman to
attend a firm outing where the men
play golf all day and poker all night;
• Making outcasts of women
lawyers who do not socialize with the
men at male sporting events after
work;
• Some male lawyers attempting to
hold a wet T-shirt contest at a
weekend outing featuring the female
summer associates, but settling for a
bathing-suit competition, during
which some participants said they felt
humiliated but didn't protest because
they were candidates for year-round
jobs;
• Giving women associates, but not
men associates, primarily low-status,
dead-end assignments;
• Making two women who were
finally admitted to the firm as
partners, work twice as hard as the
men for the same recognition, giving
rise to fear among the other women
that the first two (being so
outstanding) have set standards that
will be difficult to meet.
Ms. Hishon has chosen not to pursue
any of these or other similar matters
before the Supreme Court, but to limit
the issue to denial of partnership. She
has also chosen to concentrate on her
civil rights action under Title VII and
not to litigate any causes of action she
may have for breach of contract or
fraud, based upon King & Spalding's
representation that she would be
considered for partnership on a fair and
non-discriminatory basis. 14 In so doing,
she has squarely placed before the
Supreme Court the hard question,
emotionally but accurately stated in her
Brief, as follows:
Can King & Spalding, or any other
law firm that has 15 or more
employees, post a sign on the door of
its partnership meetings that reads:
KEEP OUT
NO WOMEN, NO BLACKS, NO
JEWS ADMITTED"
Analysis of the Competing
Interests - Asking the Hard
Questions
To answer this question, King &
Louisville Law Examiner, March, 1984 5
min.ation in Law Firms Challenged
Spalding argues that it is organized as a
partnership under the laws of Georgia
and that its partners have voluntarily
associated to conduct business. It asserts
"the right of law partners to choose
those with whom they will share
ownership, responsibility, duty,
reputation ... , experience ... , position and
influence ... , standing ... , tradition and
prestige... for a lifetime of law
practice.'' 16
King & Spalding further asserts that
the invitation to become a partner is not
cognizable under Title VII as an
employment opportunity or as a term,
condition or privilege of employ.ment.
The election to partnership is not a
promotion, but a change in status from
employee to employer-owner. 17 The
executive branch of government must
not be permitted to intrude upon the
decision of King & Spalding in admitting
or denying partnership to any
individual. 18
·
The Eleventh Circuit agreed with King
& Spalding that it was "clearly a
voluntary association of lawyers for the
purpose of practicing law as joint
venturers," 19 that partners are owners,
not employees of the partnership, that
Title VII does not permit intervention
into matters of voluntary association,
and that Title VII does not reach
"decisions dealing with the formation of
partnerships.'' 20
If the Supreme Court should affirm
and find for King & Spalding's position,
what would that mean for the future of
Title VII's mandate and the ability "to
effectuate its purpose - to remedy acts
of discrimination within the
employment context"? 21 Would such a
ruling be compatible with the
philosophy expressed in Runyon v.
McCrary/2 which held that private
schools could not reject qualified black
applicants for admission?
In Runyon, the Court reasoned that
belief in racial segregation was protected
by the First Amendment, but that
practice of it was not. "(W)hile
invidious private discrimination may be
characterized as a form of exercising
freedom of association protected by the
First Amendment... it has never been
afforded Constitutional protection. " 23
Runyon was decided under 42 U .S.C.
§1981 rather than §2000e24 but the
philosophy is applicable. Can it be said
that admission to a private school is so
different from admission to a private
voluntary association for the conduct of
business that the application of different
legal principles is required? The
Supreme Court, at least as of 1976,
believed "prohibition of racial
discrimination that interferes with the
making and enforcement of contracts
for private educational services furthers
goals closely analogous to those served
by §1981's elimination of racial
discrimination in the making of private
employment contracts. " 25
Does the Court still believe that?
Should the law distinguish between race
and sex discrimination?
On the other hand, not all the hard
questions are generated by King &
Spalding's position. Ms. Hishon's
position is worthy of analysis as well.
She argues the "economic realities"
of King & Spalding are that its partners
are its employees, thus making
promotion to partnership an
employment opportunity she was denied
in violation of Title VII. King &
Spalding has been practicing law under
that name since 1885. By virtue of its
partnership agreement, King &
Spalding, far from being a traditional
common law partnership, ( 1) has a
perpetual existence unaffected by the
entry, resignation, or death of partners,
(2) has central control and management
by a committee electep and functioning
in much the same way as a corporate
board of directors, and (3) provides that
upon withdrawal, a partner's ownership
interest is limited to a refund of invested
capital and his share of undistributed net
earnings, excluding any interest in
accounts receivable, inventory, etc. 26
Thus, Ms. Hishon contends, King &
Spalding is more like a corporation than
a partnership, and individual partners
are more like employees of the
partnership than owners.
She further argues that, when King &
Spalding promised to give her equal
consideration for partnership,
promotion to partnership became an
"employment opportunity" or a "term,
condition or privilege" of employment
covered under Title VII's prohibition of
sex discrimination in employment.
Labels . of "employee" or "owner"
should not be determinitive. 27
The Southern District of New York
agreed with Ms. Hishon on these points
under almost identical facts. The Court
in Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore28
held that an Italian Catholic attorney
stated a cause of action under Title VII
by alleging he was denied promotion to
partnership in the defendant law firm on
account of his national origin, religion,
or both.
The Court dismissed the existence of
any First Amendment interests of the
partnership in privacy or freedom of
association. 29 It went on to suggest that
even if the First Amendment applied to
the promotion of associate to
partnership, Title VII nevertheless
reached that part of the decision that
might have taken into account race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. 30
In so holding, the Court avoided
addressing a number of hard questions.
It attempted to distinguish promoting an
associate from hiring a non-associate as
partner or firing a partner. Yet, if being
a partner is indeed a term, condition or
privilege of employment, what
difference does it make if the
employment opportunity is obtained
from within or without the partnership?
Is it less a violation of Title VII to deny
partnership to an Italian Catholic or a
woman who applies for an opening from
another firm than one who applies from
the same firm? And how can the
decision to take on a partner be different
from the decision to eliminate one?
In addition, if Lucido had proved his
case, 31 what would have been his
remedy? Would he be entitled to
practice with the firm that had rejected
him? Would he be entitled to damages?
How would they be measured? These
same considerations are at stake in
Hishon v. King & Spalding.
How Far Did Congress Go?
Moreover, the greater ramifications
of ruling that sex discrimination may not
legally be a part of the partnership
decision have not yet been explored.
Would the coverage of Title VII extend
to lawyers who were not partners in a
law firm, but only shared space? Would
it apply to their decision to take on
another attorney to share space in a
vacant office?
Consider how closely-held
corporations might be affected. Many
big businesses are owned by families,
with the stock structured such that
ownership remains in the family (rights
of first refusal, etc.). Such businesses
may also require, either through written
or unwritten rules, that only one of the
family member/shareholders can be a
president or vice president. This practice
would have the effect of preventing
persons of different racial or ethnic
backgrounds from being promoted to
president or vice president where a
stockholder refused to marry outside of
his/her race or ethnic background. Are
such decisions regarding who can be a
stockholder / officer /family member
different from the decision of who to
take on as a partner? Are partner­owners
like those of King & Spalding
sufficiently different from corporate
shareholders to exempt the latter from
Title VII coverage? What if the decision
were clearly made for the sole purpose
of preventing persons from certain racial
or ethnic minorities from becoming
president of the corporation?
What if the stockholders wanted to
prevent their female family members
from becoming president? Could they
require pre-nuptial agreements whereby
the fiance would waive her right to
become president upon receiving shares
in the business? Would such an
agreement be void as against public
policy by violating the intent of Title
VII?
These are some of the questions raised
by Hishon v. King & Spalding.
In the final analysis, we will be left
with the task of eliminating sex
discrimination in the legal profession
and in society at large, regardless of how
the Supreme Court rules. It will be a
great achievement if we can tear down
the stubborn "brick wall" that keeps
women from advancing without
destroying the fragile foundation of our
Constitution.
Footnotes
1 Address by Maureen Reagan, "The
Gender Gap," Indiana University
Southeast, New Albany, Indiana,
February I2, 1984. Cited in In The River
City, Newsletter of the River City
Business and Professional Women,
Louisville, Ky., March 1, I984, p.1.
2 Stewart, "Are Women Lawyers
Discriminated Against at Large Law
Firms?'-', The Wall Street Journal.
3 Brief of Petitioner, Hishon v. King &
Spalding, 678 F2d 1022 (11th Cir. 1982).
In the Supreme Court of the United
States, Oct. term 1982.
• Stewart, supra at p. 1.
j /d.
6 Brief of Respondent, Hishon v. King
& Spalding, In the Supreme Court of the
United States, Oct. Term 1982, at 33-34.
7 Smith, "A Profile of Lawyer Life
Styles," American Bar Association
Journal, February 1984 at 50.
8Mitchell, Women's Estate, (1973), at
64-65.
10 1d.
II 1d.
12 /d. at 68; "Redstockings
Manifesto," Morgan, Sisterhood is
Powerful, (1970), at 533-4,535; Hole
and Leving, Rebirth of Feminism
(1973), at 138-140.
13 Stewart, supra. It is not intended
that King & Spalding be singled out for
criticism. The literature suggests that the
"old boys," "locker-room" mentality is
hardly unusual in such firms.
14See Hishon v. King & Spalding,
supra note 3, at 1029.
" Brief of Petitioner, supra at 23.
16 Brief of Respondent, supra, at 12,
quoting Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629
at 634 (1950)
17 Brief of Respondent at 62-64.
18 Id. at 19-31.
19 Hishon v. King & Spalding, supra,
note 14, at 1028.
20 Id. at 1030.
21 Id. at 1026.
22 427 U.S. 160 (1976)
23 Id. at 176, quoting Norwood v.
Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
24 42 U.S.C. §1981 (1982) is an
exercise of legislative power under §2 of
the 13th Amendment prohibiting
slavery. The statute prohibits racial
discrimination interfering with the
making and enforcing of contracts.
There is no similar statute for the
prohibition of sex discrimination. If
Hishon v. King & Spalding is decided in
Ms. Hishon 's favor, it will only cover
employment situations. If the Court
rules that §2000e cannot reach the type
of private discrimination that §1981 can,
could blacks nonetheless be protected
from refusal to admission of
partnerships under §1981?
25 Runyon, supra, note 22, at 179.
26 Brief of Petitioner, supra at 27-40.
27 ld. at 41-46.
28 425 F. Supp 123 (S.D. N.Y. 1977).
29 But see Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965); NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 499 (1958),· See also
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. i 13 (1973),
affirming fundamental rights implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty.
30 Lucido, supra note 28, at 129.
31Mr. Lucido had also proceeded
on breach of contract theory. The case
was eventually dismissed with prejudice
in 1981.
6 Louisville Law Examiner, March, 1984
Rule Changes Put Added Responsibilities on Lawyers
(Continued from Page 1)
Pleadings, Motions, and Other Papers;
Sanctions." Before, it was only a
pleading which was to be signed by the
attorney in his individual name with his
address stated; now, Rule 11 extends this
requirement to ''Every pleading,
motion, and other papers." Before, the
certificate constituted by signing applied
only to those pleadings listed in Rule
7.01; now, the attorney certifies to the
best of his knowledge, information, and
belief "that he has read the pleading,
motion, .or other paper." Before, Rule
11, as a sanction, provided for the
striking of sham and false pleadings.
Such language has been removed from
the Ruie and those matters now are to be
raised by a motion to strike pursuant to
Rule 12.06. In some cases the improper
pleading may also constitute a violation
of Ruie 11 and joined therewith may be
a motion for an appropriate sanction
under that Rule, which in a proper case
may include attorney's fees.
Other Papers
Some disagreement exists as to the
scope of the meaning of the term "other
papers." First, it is limited to documents
which are signed by the attorney or the
party. So signed, among others, are
answers and ()bjections to written
interrogatories (Rule 33.01), requests for
the production of documents (Rule 34,
Form 19), requests for admissions (Rule
36, Form 20), notices of appeal (Rule
73.03, Form 22). 2 Second, the document
must be one filed or used in the
particuiar litigation, other than an in­house
or private document not
becoming part of the record in the case
or shown to, or acted upon, by other
counsel. To the extent that other papers
are embraced within amended Rule 11,
the additional matters certified to by the
attorney under that Rule apply.
With regard to discovery papers, the
1983 amendments to the Federal Rules
add new Rule 26(g) entitled, "Signing of
Discovery Requests, Responses, and
Objections." 3 In a note to amended
Rule 11 the Advisory Committee for the
Federal Rules explains:
Although the encompassing reference
to "other papers" in new Rule 11
literally includes discovery papers,
the certification requirement in that
contest is governed by proposed new
Rule 26(g). Discovery motions,
however, fall within the ambit of
Rule 11.
Of course, a specific Rule prevails over a
general and therefore as to discovery
papers, other than motions, new Federal
Rule 26(g) has precedence over Federal
Rule 11. However, where a jurisdiction,
such as Kentucky, has adopted amended
Rule 11, but not Rule 26(g), the
requirements and sanctions of Rule 11
apply to discovery papers which are
signed by an attorney or party as the
above note suggests. As to new Rule
26(g), the Advisory Committee
elaborated in its notes to the Rule:
If primary responsibility for
conducting discovery is to continue to
rest with the litigants, they must be
obliged to act responsibly and avoid
abuse. With this in mind, Rule 26(g),
which parallels the amendments to
Rule II, requires an attorney or
unrepresented party to sign each
discovery request, response, or
objection. Motions relating to
discovery are governed by Rule II .
However, since a discovery request,
response, or objection usually deals
with more specific subject matter
than motions or papers, the elements
that must be certified in connection
with the former are spelled out more
completely. The signature is a
certification of the elements set forth
in Rule 26(g).
Reasonable Inquiry before
Signing
Amended Ruie I1 imposes higher
standards of care and professionalism
upon the attorney than the former Rule
did. The new language requires the
attorney, before signing a pleading,
motion, or other paper, to make
reasonable inquiry as to both the facts
and the law. It reads:
The signature of the attorney or party
constitutes a certificate by him that he
has read the pleading, motion, or
other paper; that to the best of his
knowledge, information, and belief
formed after reasonable inquiry it is
well grounded in fact and is
warranted by existing law or a good
faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing
law, and that it is not interposed for
any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay
or needless increase in the cost of
litigation.
With regard to this new standard of
professional responsibility in preparing
and signing documents for litigation, the
Advisory Committee for the Federal
Rules, which proposed the new
language, explained in a note to Rule II:
The· rule is not intended to chill an
attorney's enthusia.sm or creativity in
pursuing factual or legal theories.
The court is expected to avoid using
the wisdom of hindsight and should
test the signer's conduct by inquiring
what was reasonable to believe at the
time the pleading, motion, or other
paper was submitted. Thus, what
constitutes a reasonable inquiry may
depend on such factors as how much
time for investigation was available to
the signer; whether he had to rely on a
client for information as to the facts
underlying the pleading, motion, or
other paper; whether the pleading,
motion, or other paper was based on
a plausible view of the law; or
whether he depended on forwarding
counsel or another member of the
bar.
While amended Rule II does not
prohibit an attorney from delegating to
others, such as to associates or
paralegals, aspects of the investigation
of the facts and the law, he or she must
be mindful that the responsibility for
complying with the standards prescribed
by Rule 11 rests upon the person signing
the document.
Sanctions
Any appropriate sanction is now
available against an offending attorney
or his client, or both, including "an
order to pay to the other party or parties
the amount of the reasonable expenses
incurred because of the filing of the
pleading, motion, or other paper,
including a reasonable attorney's fee."
It must be stressed that such monetary
penalty may be assessed against the
attorney. Before amendment, a wilful
violation was required and the only
penalty against an attorney, apart from
striking a sham or false pleading, was
"appropriate disciplinary action ." Also,
the former Rule did not specify who was
to take the initiative in seeking such
action. The amended Rule now
provides:
If a pleading, motion, or other paper
is signed in violation (note that the
world "wilful" has been omitted) of
this rule, the court, upon motion or
upon its own initiative, shall impose
upon the person who signed it, a
represented party, or both ...
The Advisory Committee for the Federal
Rules anticipates that the courts will
become more active in enforcing the
higher standards of Rule 11 upon
attorneys. It explains in a note to the
Rule:
The new language is intended to
reduce the reluctance of the courts to
impose sanctions ... by emphasizing
the responsibilities of the attorney
and reenforcing those obligations by
the imposition of sanctions.
It adds:
The detection and punishment of a
violation of the signing requirement,
encouraged by the amended rule, is
part of the court's responsibility for
securing the system's effective
operation.
It is contemplated that a proceeding to
initiate sanctions, either upon a motion
by the other party or upon the court's
initiative, will be decided with a
minimum use of discovery or of matters
outside of the particular document. New
Rule ll does not require an attorney (or
party) to disclose privileged
communications or work product in
order to show substantial justification
for signing the document. The court has
discretion to impose sanctions on either
the attorney, the party the signing
attorney represents, or both of them. In
this respect amended Rule II is similar
to the sanction provision of Rule
37 .02(3) for non-compliance with a
discovery order. As pertains to a
proceeding initiated by the motion by
the other party, the Advisory Committee
recommends:
A party seeking sanctions should give
notice to the court and the offending
party promptly upon discovering a
basis for doing so. The time when
sanctions are to be imposed rests in
the discretion of the trial judge.
However, it is anticipated that in the
case of pleadings the sanctions issue
under Rule II normally will be
determined at the end- of the
litigation, and in the case of motions
at the time when the motion is
decided or shortly thereafter. The
procedure obviously must comport
with due process requirements. The
particular format to be followed
should depend on the circumstances
of the situation and the severity of the
sanction under consideration. In
many situations the judge's
participation in the proceedings
provides him with full knowledge of
the relevant facts and little further
inquiry will be necessary.
In conclusion, Rule 11 now requires
attorneys to heed the advice commonly
given to clients of knowing what you are
signing before you sign it.
FOOTNOTES
1. The Advisory Committee for the
Federal Rules in its note to amended
Rule 11 states:
Since its original promulgation, Rule
11 has provided for the striking of
pleadings and the imposition of
disciplinary sanctions to check abuses
in the signing of pleadings. Its
provisions have always applied to
motions and other pleadings by virtue
of incorporation by reference in Rule
7(b)(2). (Note: same as Kentucky
Rule 7.02(2).)
2. Prof. Moore writes in Section 7.05
of Moore's Federal Practice:
Embraced within the term "other
papers" are affidavits, depositions,
written notices, appearances,
demands, offers and the like.
3. Rule 26(g) reads:
Every request for discovery or
response or objection thereto made
by a party represented by an attorney
shalf be signed by at least one
attorney of record in his individual
name, whose address shall be stated
. . . The signature of the attorney or
party constitutes a certification that
he has read the request, response, or
objection, and that to the best of his
knowledge, information, and belief
formed after a reasonable inquiry it
is: (1) consistent with these rules and
warranted by existing law or a good
faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing
law; (2) not interposed for any
improper purpose, such as to harass
or to cause unnecessary delay or
needless increase in the cost of
litigation; and (3) not unreasonable
or unduly burdensome or expensive,
given the needs of the case, the
discovery already had in the case, the
amount in controversy, and the
importance of the issues at stake in
the litigation. If a request, response,
or objection is not signed, it shall be
stricken unless it is signed promptly
after the omission is called to the
attention of the party making the
request, response or objection and a
party shalf not be obligated to take
any action with respect to it until it is
signed.
If a certification is made in violation
of the rule, the court, upon motion or
upon its own initiative, shall impose
upon the person who made the
certification, the party on whose
behalf the request, response, or
objection is made, or both, an
appropriate sanction, which may
include an order to pay the amount of
the reasonable expenses incurred
because of the violation, including a
reasonable attorney's fee. (Note:
Much of the language is identical to
that in amended Rule 11. Kentucky
has not adopted Rule 26(g).)
Louisville Law Examiner, March, 1984 7
Local Lawyer Sees Advertising As Wave of Future
By Neil Ward
"I've been advertising longer than
anyone in the state and it's been good to
me," Louisville attorney and U of L
Law School graduate Richard Shapero
said. "I've spent hundreds of thousands
of dollars on television commercials.
I've been willing to do what a lot of
advertising attorneys are afraid to do
and that's make a major commitment to
advertising ." ·
Prevented from advertising for years,
attorneys got the green light in 1977
when the U.S. Supreme Court in Bates
v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350,
ruled that attorneys had the right to
advertise their services.
While the debate as to whether
attorney advertising is detrimental to the
profession rages on even after the court
decision, Shapero said the issue isn't
worth debating.
"Attorney advertising is here, so get
used to it," Shapero said. "If you don't
want to advertise, then don't."
In fact, Shapero said attorneys have
been advertising for decades. To build
their practice, attorneys have gotten
involved in politics, joined country
clubs, wined and dined wealthy,
influential individuals and a variety of
other tactics calculated to get their
names and faces in front of the paying
public.
"Instead of spending my money on
country clubs and restaurants, I spend
my money on the tube," Shapero said.
However, as most business people will
tell you, advertising is a complicated
business and if you don't know what
you're doing, you ' re just wasting your
money. Shapero said he doesn't just
advertise, he markets. Shapero decides
what type of person he wants to reach
with his advertising and then he designs
a commercial to convey his message to
the target audience. Then, using
demographic studies that the television
stations have compiled, Shapero runs his
commercials during the time period
when his target audience is most likely to
be viewing the tube.
To date, Shapero's commercials have
tried to reach .people who need help in
filing bankruptcy and people who are
facing criminal charges.
"I don't advertise help with divorce
proceedings, because there's no urgency
to a divorce. A lot of people split up for
six months or a year and when it's
convenient and affordable, they finally
get around to filing for divorce,"
Shapero said.
"But if your car is about to be
repossessed, or your wages garnished
because you're in such bad financial
pERsoN~\...--------.
\ N J u R 'l M~~E~E:E~~~e::ED
HOSPITAL AND HOME
VISITS FOR THE DISABLED
•AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS
•BODILY INJURIES (ALL TYPES)
•DEATH CLAIMS
•SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY
•WORKERS' COMPENSATION
•MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
•DOG BITES
•NURSING HOME INJURIES
shape, or if you're . facing criminal
charges, you're feeling the pressure to
get an attorney's help," Shapero said.
Richard Shapero said he tries to reach
the 70 to 80 percent of the public that
needs an attorney, but for various
reasons doesn't get one. Shapero said
people are indoctrinated to the idea that
when you don't feel well you go see a
doctor, but a large percentage of the
public doesn't go see an attorney when
they are having serious legal problems.
Shapero said he never advertises price
in his commercials, because that's not
the purpose of his commercials.
"Commericals should be telling
people how attorneys can help them.
Advertising hundred dollar divorces
doesn't tell the public anything," he
said.
Shapero claims his ads are generating
revenue for the entire legal · community
in Louisville. He believes that for every
call he gets as a result of his ~
commercials, seven· or eight other
attorneys also get calls from people that
have been motivated to get legal help
because of Shapero's ads.
In addition to producing his own legal
commercials with the assistance of his
advertising agent, Shapero has formed
the Lawman, a lawyers' management
and marketing service to help other
attorneys successfully market their
services through media advertising.
Legislators Atte111pt to Work Out Differences;
~~--~------~-- Tougher Drunk Driving Law is Likely To Result
By Mike Schafer
When the 1984 Kentucky General
Assembly adjourns, the Commonwealth
is very likely to have a new drunk driving
law which will amend KRS Chapter 189.
The Senate and the House have passed
the bill. So if differences in the bills
passed by each chamber can be reconcil­ed,
the legislation will be sent to the
Governor for her approval. This bill in-
• T,vp· Lrr·ocor>~SENT ....L.I I L. IV I LAW Krt$ 1&5b5 1 You HAvr .BmJ,ARR£sT£D FoR OPERATING
A MoroR VEH!C.LE WH!LE UNnER THE lNrLUENct
OF TNro xrcA TING BEvERAGEs.
Q You ARE REQUESTED To Sus•m To A
CHEMICAL Trsr To DnmuNE YouR BLooD
ALCOHOL Co~J:IENi WILL You TAK[ Tm Tm ?
3 lF You KtFUSE, You WILL Los£ YouR
.DRIVERS LrwJs££oR Six (6) Mor-n11s.
WILL You rvow lAKE. THE TEsT?
eludes a $150 fee charged to convicted
drunk drivers, in addition to fines and
court costs and a mandatory 4 hours in
jail for offenders with a .15 OJo blood
alcohol level or higher. The House did
not approve a mandatory jail sentence
for first offenders. This was the primary
reason for failure of the 1982 "slammer
bill."
If approved, those who operate motor
vehicles on Kentucky highways while
under the influence of alcohol or any
other substance which "impairs" one's
driving ability will be penalized.
Preliminary breath tests may be ad­ministered
in the field by law enforce­ment
agencies to suspected offenders if
such tests give an accurate reading of
blood alcohol content. Films of the test
are allowed to be made and used in
court. Refusal to take a test cannot be
used aginst the defendant in court.
The test will create the following
presumptions. An individual with a
blood alcohol level of .05% or less is
presumed not to be under the influence
of intoxicating beverages. Between .050Jo
and .10%, the blood alcohol level
doesn't create a presumption either way,
but may be used in conjunction with
other evidence to determine guilt. A
blood alchollevel of .10% or more gives
the presumption that the defendant was
under the influence of intoxicating
beverages.
If the defendant's blood alcohol level
is less than .15% the prosecution may
agree to amendment of the violation.
Above .15 OJo, the prosecution is not
allowed to agree to such amendments.
The House and Senate have taken
conflicting positions on whether, before
sentencing, a violator should have a
non-waivable presentence hearing. At
such a hearing, the court would consider
past driving record, alcohol or drug
dependency and abuse status, and
recommendations of the prosecution
before sentencing the defendant.
Following this hearing, with a showing
Photo by
Motorist arrested for drunk driving is given a Breathalyzer test to determine
his blood alcohol level.
of probable cause, the court could sus­pend
the offender's driving license until
final disposition of the case. This
suspension may be reviewed after 14
days and in no circusmtance is to exceed
60 days.
Penalties for first offenders will in­clude
a fine between $200 and $500, bet­ween
two and 30 days in jail, or both.
The offender's driving license may also
be revoked for six months unless he or
she enrolls in a drivers improvement
program. After sentencing, the defen­dant
may ask for two to 30 days in a
community labor program in lieu of fine
or imprisonment. If a death is caused by
the defendant's intoxication, imprison­ment
is mandatory.
For a second offense within a five­year
period, an offender may receive a
fine from $350 to $500 and imprison-ment
from seven days to six months. In
addition, the defendant may be sentenc­ed
to community labor for 10 days to 12
months and his or her driving license
revoked for one year.
Third and subsequent offenses within
a five-year period will receive a fine
from $500 to $1000 and imprisonment
from 30 days to 12 months. The court
may also order 10 days to 12 months of
community labor.
In addition to the above penalties, the
court has the discretion to sentence any
offender to an alcohol or substance
abuse program.
Any offender under 18 years of age
will have his or her driver's license
revoked until he or she reaches age 18,
or as stated in the above provisions,
whichever results in the longer period.
8 Louisville Law Examiner, March, 1984
U of L Students Provided with free Legal Services
By Joel D. Zakem
Since October, 1978, University of
Louisville students have had the
opportunity to receive free legal
information. That date marked the
establishment of the Student Legal
Services' office at the University.
Denise M. Clayton, the Director and
sole staff member of the service,
estimates that she speaks with
approximately 15 students a week. In
addition, she assists the Student
Government Association (which funds
the office), student publications, and
other campus organizations with their
legal problems.
Within the past year, the office has
also begun helping students with
litigation. Though Clayton answers
inquiries in many legal areas, the
litigation is currently limited to two
areas: uncontested divorce (if no
children are involved) and small claims
court.
Clayton has headed Student Legal
Services since its inception. A 1976
graduate of U of L Law School, she said
that she · would be interested in seeing
more people from the law school
become involved with the service.
"Right now, we have no formal
connection with the law school," she
said, altho1,1gh, in- ·the past, a faculty
member had served on an advisory
committee. She said she would welcome
suggestions from the law school
community, especially in the area of
student involvement.
"This would be a great opportunity
for students," she said. "But I realize
the program will have to be expanded
first."
One area in which expansion would be
needed, according to Clayton, is in
finances. A lack of funding has cut her
hours from full time to three quarter
time. She realizes that without the funds
to pay students, attracting law students
will be difficult.
"But if there is interest," she said,
"I'd be willing to go after more
funding.'' As an alternative, she said she
would look into the possibility of setting
up a practicum where students may be
able to receive some classroom credit in
exchange for their work. "We need
closer ties with the law school," she
said.
Clayton is also hoping for increased
campus awareness of Student Legal
Services and what they do. To aid in
this, a 24-page Student Legal Services
Handbook has been published. The
book is available at several locations on
campus. It was compiled by Clayton,
with the assistance of several local
attorneys, and contains information on
some of the more common legal
problems faced by students.
The service also sponsors a monthly
seminar at the Ecumenical Center. This
takes place on the first Monday of each
month, beginning at noon.
The Student Legal Services Office is
located in Room 12 of the Student
Center; phone 588-5787.
Pho10 by }u(~V Hoge
Denise M. Clayton is Director of Student Legal Services, where U of L
students can get free legal information.
Louisville Law Examiner
School of Law
University of Louisville
Louisville, Kentucky 40292
Non-Profit
Organization
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John M. Harlan Louis D. Brandeis (.
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Law Examiner
Volume9
Jailhouse Reality
Follows Drunk
Driving Arrest
.. ............... page 1
Amended FRCP
Rule 11 Explained
................ . page 1
Symposium to
Honor Dedication
of New Wing
................. page 2
''Brandeis Brief'':
Sex Discrimination
in Law Firms
.............. ... page 4
Local Attorney
Extols Advertising
.... ............. page 7
March, 1984 Number 5